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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Combining Autocracy and Majority Voting: 
The Canonical Succession Rules of the Latin Church 
 
 
The autocratic turn of the Latin Church in the XI-XIII century, a reaction to the secular 
power interferences, concentrated the decision-making power in the hands of the top 
hierarchy, and finally in the hands of the pope. A fundamental step was the change and 
the constitutionalisation of the procedures for leadership replacement, which were open 
successions where the contest for power was governed by elections. The autocratic 
reform limited the active electorate to the clergy only and gradually substituted the 
episcopal elections by the pope’s direct appointment. Besides, the voting rules changed 
from unanimity to the dual principle of maioritas et sanioritas (where the majority was 
identified with the greater part by number and wisdom) and finally to the numerical rule 
of qualified majority. This evolution aimed at preserving the elections from external 
interferences and at eliminating the elements of arbitrariness. The most important 
succession, the papal election, was protected by institutionalising a selectorate and its 
decision-making rules. The selectorate and the elections did not insert accountability and 
representation mechanisms but only protected the quality of the autocratic leadership and 
its autonomy.  
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Abstract 
 
 
The autocratic turn of the Latin Church in the XI-XIII century, a reaction to the secular power 
interferences, concentrated the decision-making power in the hands of the top hierarchy, and finally 
in the hands of the pope. A fundamental step was the change and the constitutionalisation of the 
procedures for leadership replacement, which were open successions where the contest for power 
was governed by elections. The autocratic reform limited the active electorate to the clergy only and 
gradually substituted the episcopal elections by the pope’s direct appointment. Besides, the voting 
rules changed from unanimity to the dual principle of maioritas et sanioritas (where the majority 
was identified with the greater part by number and wisdom) and finally to the numerical rule of 
qualified majority. This evolution aimed at preserving the elections from external interferences and 
at eliminating the elements of arbitrariness. The most important succession, the papal election, was 
protected by institutionalising a selectorate and its decision-making rules. The selectorate and the 
elections did not insert accountability and representation mechanisms but only protected the quality 
of the autocratic leadership and its autonomy.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur, nec aliud in publico consilio potest fieri1 (Plinius, 
Epistulae, Book II, 12,5): the Latin Church opposed for centuries the application of this principle to 
the procedures for its leadership replacement, which were essentially based on elections. Unanimity 
and the weighting of votes had dominated the ecclesiastic elections during the first millennium, 
until the pure numerical rule of majority was given juridical (canonical) form2 and was finally 
adopted, in coincidence with the major institutional reform of the Church in the XI-XIII century.  
In those centuries, the Latin Church faced and reacted to the secular powers repeated and serious 
attacks to its own autonomy. To support their policies and consolidate their position, kings and 
emperors severely interfered with the succession of bishops and abbots (the investiture), exerted 
pressures on the papal elections, dismissed popes and bishops, caused schisms, autonomously 
summoned ecclesiastic Councils. The Church reacted to emancipate the clergy from the control of 
emperors and feudal lords and to sharply differentiate itself as a political and legal entity from the 
secular polities. This represented a radical discontinuity in European history: the Papal Revolution3, 
which began in 1075, when Gregory VII (1073-1085) proclaimed the papal supremacy and 
independence from the secular power, and ended in 1122, when a compromise was reached between 
the papacy and the emperors. 
The Papal Revolution caused also a sharp turn towards absolutism and autocracy in the governance 
of the Church, with the concentration of power in the hands of the pope and the elaboration of  
theocratic doctrines on the papal infallibility4, the papal primacy, the pope’s plenitudo potestatis5. 
This essay aims at interpreting the links between the autocratic regime of the Latin Church, and its 
                                                 
1 [Votes must be counted and not weighted: there is no other alternative in public decisions] 
2 The Latin Church is a structure governed by rules and laws, although a deep antinomy between its inner nature, a 
community grounded on faith, and the nature of law has been repeatedly pointed out. The Lutheran canonist Rudolf 
Sohm (1892) stated that the nature of the canonical law is in contradiction with the nature of the Church. Other scholars 
acknowledge the existence of the laws of the Church only when the State grants it the ius statuendi: this implies a 
primacy of the laws of the State and that the canonical rules depend on the secular approval. 
3 The historical importance of the Papal Revolution is thoroughly discussed by H.J. Berman (1983). According to 
Berman (1983), the term “reform” is a “serious understatement, reflecting the desire of the papal party itself to play 
down the magnitude of the discontinuity between what had gone before and what came after. The original Latin term, 
reformatio, may suggest a more substantial break in continuity.[..] Another term used to denote the same era, namely 
the Investiture Struggle, .. connect the conflict between the papal and the imperial (or royal) parties with the principal 
slogan of the papal reformers: ‘the freedom of the Church’. But even this dramatic slogan does not adequately convey 
the full dimensions of the revolutionary transformation,…. the disengagement of the two spheres of the sacred and the 
profane, from which there stemmed a release of energy and creativity analogous to a process of nuclear fission” 
(Berman, 1983, 87-88). 
4 The collection of twenty-seven propositions by Gregory VII, known as the Dictatus Papae (1095), firmly restated an 
old idea (already expressed in the collection known as False Decretals or Pseudo-Isidore of the IX century), that the 
Roman Church can never err. Canonists initially distinguished between the Church (sedes), which can never err, and the 
pope (sedens), who may err. However, at mid XIII centuries the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility was more firmly 
grounded by St. Bonaventura and the Franciscan Pietro Olmi: the latter wrote in 1279 that all Roman Catholics should 
obey the pope tamquam regulae inerrabili [as if he were an infallible rule]. 
5 Although it had already been employed in the XI century, the term plenitudo potestatis [the fullness of power] became 
the principal expression of the pontifical almightiness in the XIII century .  
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anomalous procedures for the autocratic succession, namely elections by majority voting, which are 
usually associated with democracy. 
 
1.1 The issue of autocratic succession  
The growing political economy literature on autocracies6 is increasingly aware of the institutional 
heterogeneity of these regimes, which includes the mechanisms for leadership replacement. Tullock 
(1987) first focused on the constitutional modes of autocratic succession (open, hereditary, 
appointed) and on the relationship between them and the occurrence of coups against the incumbent 
autocrat. Tullock (1987) and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2000) account for the evolution of the 
constitutional rules of autocracies towards hereditary succession. The main focus of some recent 
trends of research is instead on the variables (in particular, growth and welfare-enhancing policies) 
that affect the probability of a dictator’s survival (Grossman and Noh, 1994; Overland et al. 2005; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) and on the institutions that make autocratic governments 
accountable (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Besely and Kudamatsu, 2007). Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003) have emphasizes the role of the ‘selectorate’, i.e. of the group of individuals on whom the 
leader depends to hold onto power and who play a role in shaping his policy incentives. Besely and 
Kudamatsu (2007) state that autocracies are successful if the selectorate can credibly remove 
poorly-performing leaders and that an autocratic regime with a high rate of leadership change is 
more likely to be successful on average than those with less turnover, as it has been able to generate 
accountability mechanisms in the absence of open contests for power. 
The Latin Church which was shaped by the Papal Revolution of the XI-XIII centuries, is a religious 
autocracy and a successful one in terms of its time survival. Its constitutional rules provide for open 
succession, where “no singular particular individual is designated ex ante as being the automatic 
successor upon vacancy” (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2000, 66). Open succession is however regulated by  
elections at the death of the autocrat (the pope) and of the top hierarchy (bishops and abbots), an 
element which is atypical in an autocratic regime.  
Since its origin, the leadership replacement in the Church has been elective. However, in the ancient 
Church, the term electio referred more to a collective choice than to a real voting procedure: the 
word itself, eligere, means ‘to choose’ and not to ‘elect’. In a religious perspective, the electoral 
moment was conceived as the expression of the whole community, acting under the influence of 
                                                 
6 The term autocracy is employed as in Tullock (1987) in relatively broad terms: a political regime where an individual 
is de facto – and often de jure -  the ultimate decision-maker. This does not imply that the advice or preferences of other 
institutions (an executive council, a parliament) or individuals (a counsellor) are not taken into account or that there are 
no legal restrictions to action. Other studies, especially empirical analyses, define autocracies according to the presence 
or absence of elections or regularized contests for leadership and on polity scores measuring the degree of democracy 
(Besely and Kudamatsu, 2007) 
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God’s will: voters were defined by Dante denuntiatores divinae providentiae7. Besides, the elected 
candidates were not considered the representatives of their constituency, as their life-long and 
unconditioned mandate, the transmission of the true faith and of the protection of the Church unity, 
was meant to come from a divine source. This rather mystical characters were not lost even later, 
when the electoral moment took the traits of a juridical act and the theological concepts adapted to 
the needs of politics. 
This change was set up by historical circumstances, the break-up of the Roman Empire, the 
invasions and the political situation under the Merovingian and Carolingian kings and under other 
rulers, which compromised the spiritual power of the Church with the exercise of temporal powers. 
The bishops frequently remedied for the lack of civic governance and provided the cities with 
essential services: justice, administration, defence, food and water supply. The temporal rulers often 
complained for such an extensive power: “Our treasury is void: our richness have gone to the 
Church. Nobody reigns but the bishops. Our honour is dead: it has gone to the bishops of the cities” 
was the complaint of the Merovingian king Chilperic I in the VI century. 
The ecclesiastical involvement in both civic and spiritual competences raised the question of the 
appointment: who had the right to appoint a bishop, given that he was the spiritual guide of the city 
but that he also performed governance functions8? The temporal rulers aimed at the controlling 
these independent authorities and challenged the Church in its appointment functions, by 
influencing the selection procedures and by making the validity of the elections dependent on their 
consent (§ 2.1). This sparked off the reaction of the Church and notably Gregory’s VII Reform, i.e. 
the consolidation of the autocratic structure and of its dogmatic foundations (§.2.2), and the 
Investiture Struggle.  
Although the Church was increasingly moving towards an autocratic regime, it did not renounce 
elections to regulate its leadership succession, rather it constitutionalised them by the draft of 
canonical procedures (§.3). The evolution of the canonical electoral laws is an example of the 
relationship between the search for stability in autocratic regimes and their constitutional rules 
governing succession, as illustrated by Tullock (1987). However, the electoral rules of the Church 
in the XI-XIII centuries did not evolve into hereditary succession, as Tullock’s analysis assumes, 
but preserved their open succession character, although modified in order to grant stability, to avoid 
multiple equilibria and to isolate the electoral process.     
The canonical rules provided for precise definitions of the active electorate (§. 3.2), which was 
gradually restricted to the clergy only, and for the introduction of numerical voting rules (§. 3.3). 
                                                 
7 [Those who reveal the divine will] 
8 The Latin word employed to indicate the institution of the bishop is ordinari, which means ‘to install in a charge and 
in a social category’. This term was the same employed by the administrative language of the imperial burocracy. 
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The pure rule of majority, inherited from the Roman law codes9, was deemed inadequate with 
respect to the needs of the Church, whose character is strongly spiritualistic, transcendent and 
rigidly hierarchical. The solution of the canonical law was to associate a qualitative criterium to the 
pure numerical criterium: votes had not to be just counted, they had also to be weighted according 
to voters’ merits and wisdom. Majority was identified with the maior et sanior pars, the greater part 
by number and wisdom. The paper describes the application of the principle to the different types of 
canonical elections and its various interpretations. The papal elections will deserve particular 
attention (§.4), as they represent an exception to the double principle of the maioritas et sanioritas.  
The whole electoral system designed by the canonical laws is ideally at the opposite of the modern 
individualistic, rational approach to the problems of collective choice and voting and it is also 
anomalous with respect to the secular autocracies. The present analysis aims at accounting for the 
differences between a religious autocracy and other autocratic regimes and at employing, when 
possible, the  results provided by the political economy literature (§.5 and 6).  
 
2. The foundations of autocracy in the Latin Church during the XI-XIII centuries 
 
The competition between the papacy and the temporal powers developed in the Middle Ages both 
on doctrinal and on political grounds (Figure 1): when the temporal powers tried to make the 
Church an instrumentum regni (Pacaut, 1957; Levillain, 1994), they aimed at the appropriation de 
facto and de jure of the appointment of its leadership. The Church reacted by structuring itself as an 
autocracy, which implied political countermoves, the elaboration of a theory of its supremacy, the 
theocratic doctrine (§ 2.2), and the setting of appropriate institutions, including the succession 
procedures (§.3 and 4).  
 
2.1 The political conflict at the origin of the autocratic reform  
The situation of the Church in the high Middle Age Europe was marked by the continuous 
interferences of the secular power. The feudal regime, simony (the sale of ecclesiastical benefices) 
and nicolaism (clerical marriage) contaminated the clerical and, especially, the episcopal status. The 
succession of the bishops in large parts of Europe largely depended on the temporal power10, 
                                                 
9 The Roman jurists applied the majority principle to the institutions (collegia) ruled by the public law. The principle 
was thus expressed: Refertur ad universos quod publice fit per maiorem partem,[what is publicly decided by the 
greatest part is to be ascribed to the whole] and Quod major pars curiae effecit, pro eo habetur ac si omnes egerint 
[what the majority decides, must be assumed to have been decided by the whole assembly]. 
10 The Formula (instructions) used by king Louis the German (843-876) for the episcopal elections states that the 
electoral right is granted by the king: « Prêtant à cette demande l’assentiment de notre pouvoir, par cet acte, nous 
concédons  à titre bienveillant à cette église le droit de choisir un évêque dans son clergé ou dans celui du diocèse » 
[Giving the assent of our power to this request, by this act, we kindly grant this church the right to choose a bishop 
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although this practice was explicitly condemned by the Cluniac reformers in the tenth century, by 
single bishops, like St. Ambrose of Milan in the fourth century, and popes (Nicholas I, 856-867), by 
local and ecumenical councils of the Church (since the Council of Paris in 556).  
In Italy, the papacy had difficulty in maintaining its autonomy with respect to the Byzantine empire 
and to the ancient Roman families. Supporters of the different parties strenuously strove to obtain 
the election of their leader, sometimes causing schisms and civil conflicts, as on the occasion of the 
double elections of Ursinus and of pope Damasus I in 366, of Eulalus and of pope Boniface I in 
418, of pope Symmachus and the of deacon Laurentius in 498. The Byzantine emperors interfered 
with the elections, sometimes imposed by force their anti-popes or exiled incumbent popes who 
were not loyal to them (pope Liberius in the fourth century, pope Silverius in 536). Since the ninth 
century, the pope’s autonomy began to be challenged also by the increasingly powerful Frankish 
rulers: 
 
« Some historians argue that Pope Leo III made Charlemagne emperor, but it is closer to the truth to say that 
Charlemagne made Leo pope; and in 813 Charlemagne crowned his own son emperor without benefit of 
clergy. In fact, later German emperors required the pope, on his election, to swear an oath of loyalty to the 
emperor. Of the twenty-five popes who held office during the hundred years prior to 1059 (when a church 
synod for the first time prohibited lay investiture), twenty-one were directly appointed by emperors »  
(Berman, 1983, p.91).  
   
A serious attempt to the autonomy of the Church was the investiture, i.e. the transfer of the 
bishopric by the king’s bestowing the symbols of the territorial and administrative jurisdiction, the 
pastoral staff and the ring upon the elected bishop. The investiture implied the right of the king to 
transfer the whole charge, with its functions, rights and properties (Blumenthal, 1994) and voided of 
meaning the election a clero et populo [by the clergy and the laity], which was the legitimate source 
for the exercise of the episcopal function.   
On many occasions the Church could not react to the secular challenges which came from more 
powerful institutions. However, since the XI century it showed increasingly eager to defend its own 
autonomy: popes Leo IX (1048-1054), Nicolas II (1059-1061) and Gregory VII (1073-1085) started 
to oppose the secular investitures and in 1075 Gregory VII severely forbade them, thus setting off a 
long conflict with the emperors, which was ended by pope Callistus II and Henry V with the 
Concordat of Worms in 1122. In England and Normandy, the Concordat of Bec (1107) provided for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
within its clergy or among the diocese priests] (quoted in Gaudemet, 1997, 70). Other royal praecepta entrusted the 
bishop the governance of the diocese or ordered the consecration of the king’s preferred candidates. 
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a similar but temporary solution to the issue, which was definitely settled only after the martyrdom 
of the Archbishop Thomas Becket in 1170. 
The compromise implied a division of the sources of legitimacy. The emperor renounced to the 
investiture of the bishops by bestowing the ring and the staff and committed to respect free 
canonical elections. The pope accepted that the emperors could attend the elections of bishops, 
could grant them feudal rights of property, justice and secular government (regalia) and receive 
their homage and fealty before the liturgical consecration. Conflicts were to be judged by the 
metropolitan bishop11 and by the bishops of the ecclesiastical province, but the emperor kept a 
certain decision-making power on the disputes inside his Empire. To draft the compromise the 
Church had to renounce to the well-established concept of the indissoluble unity of the episcopate 
(which included the functions, the properties and the rights) and to separate the spiritual jurisdiction 
from the temporal jurisdiction12. The pope acknowledged a generic royal right on the possessions 
and rights of the Church13. It was not clear whether the granting of benefits corresponded to the 
emperor’s veto power over the election and this opened new disputes under the emperors Lothar III 
and Frederic I. However, the Church substantially managed to protect its own autonomy, by making 
the election a separate moment in which the emperor could not interfere. 
When the competition for legitimacy involved the election of the highest rank in the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy, the pope, no compromise could be found and the conflict repeatedly resulted in schisms, 
when two popes were simultaneously appointed, or in mutual disavowals. In both cases the 
stalemate was usually solved by the death, more rarely by the renunciation of one of the parties. In 
some instances the contest escalated into mutual disavowals by the emperor and the pope: Gregory 
VII and Henry IV deposed each other. Frederic II (1212-1250), after having been twice 
excommunicated by Gregory IX (1127-1241), tried to depose the pope and was finally deposed 
himself by pope Innocent IV in 124514. Mutual disavowals characterized also the papacy of 
Boniface VIII (1294-1303) and his conflict with the French king Philippe the Fair.  
The autonomy of the Church was strengthened by the development of the dogmatic foundations of 
the religious autocracy, the theocratic doctrine of the supremacy of the spiritual power over the 
temporal powers, and by the constitutionalisation (canonisation) of the succession procedures. This 
                                                 
11 The Metropolitan is the head of an ecclesiastical province, which gathers some dioceses. The term became 
synonymous of archbishop, even if there were some differences at the origin. 
12 Berman (1983) and other scholars consider that the separation, concurrence and interaction of the spiritual and 
temporal jurisdictions enacted by the concordats have been the principal source of the Western legal tradition. The 
concordats thus “gave rise to the formation of the first modern Western legal system, the ‘new canon law’ of the Roman  
Catholic Church, and eventually to new secular legal systems as well – royal, urban and others” (Berman, 1983, 2). 
13 This was the legal bases that turned the imperial episcopates and abbeys into elective principalities, fiefs of the 
Empire. 
14 The pope’s legitimacy in deposing the emperor stemmed from his being the vicar of Christ: “Christ could not have 
been fully acknowledged as the Lord, unless he had left behind himself a vicar entitled to pass a sentence or a 
judgement against the emperor or any other person” (Apparatus, II, 27, quoted in Camelot et al. 2001, 155). 
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aimed at isolating elections (rules for the electorate, conclaves for papal elections, timing of the 
elections) and at avoiding multiple equilibria (rules of the conclave, simple or weighted majority 
rule) which could be the pretext for the secular intervention. 
  
2.2 The ideological foundations of the autocracy: the doctrine of theocracy 
The Gregorian Reform was accompanied and supported by thorough revision of the Church 
doctrine. The Church justified its autonomy by sacralizing its leadership and by elaborating a 
doctrine of its own supremacy: the concept of the papal infallibility and primacy and of the pope’s 
plenitudo potestatis founded the constitutional autocratic reform and influenced also the rules for 
the autocratic succession. 
The Church had asserted its supremacy over the temporal powers already in the V century, when St. 
Augustine’s theory of the two Cities opposed the doctrine of Constantine, which entrusted the 
ecumenical council, supervised by the emperor, the supreme teaching on dogmatic issues and 
conceived the pope’s power as just sacramental and disciplinary. According to St. Augustine, the 
heavenly City has a supernatural essence, while the earthly City depends on it and is contingent: 
thus the Church pre-exists to the earthly kingdoms and can exert its power over them with the 
purpose to lead the peoples to salvation. The high Middle Age theologians limited the power of the 
Church on secular affairs to the settlement of moral questions and the pope’s intervention was 
justified to correct the human sins (ratione peccati). 
The theocratic doctrine was resumed at the beginning of the second millennium and was elaborated 
during the reign of about forty popes, from Leon IX (1049-1054) to Boniface VIII (1295-1304). 
The Gregorian reform was the first attempt to restate the complete spiritual and temporal 
independence of the Church. Any secular link had to be broken: the pope did not acknowledge the 
clergy that had received their power from a temporal authority. Gregory VII went further, stating 
that, given the Church responsibility for the world salvation, ratione peccati the temporal power is 
submitted to the spiritual power. The Church can control the moral behaviour of the temporal 
authorities, judging both their private life and their political action: on these grounds, the emperor 
Henry IV was twice excommunicated and then deposed in 1080. 
The emperor’s party replied by advocating the historical independence of the temporal power from 
the Church and by founding the existence of temporal power in God’s will. The two opposite 
doctrines further developed during the XII century: the canonists of the university of Bologna, 
Honorius of Autun, Hugues de Saint-Victor and St. Bernard reduced the temporal rulers to the role 
of mere executors. 
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In 1204 Innocent’s III decree Novit asserted the plenitudo ecclesiasticae potestatis, i.e. the  absolute 
and full power of the pope over all churches and over the whole clergy. The pope’s power is distinct 
from the civil power, which is subject to the law, and qualifies instead as an absolute power, free 
from any legal constraints: Secundum plenitudinem potestatis de iure possumus supra ius 
dispensare15.  
 The temporal power is independent in the administration of the human affairs but inferior to the 
spiritual power (Deliberatio 1199 and decree Venerabilem 1202) and receives its legitimacy from it, 
“like the moon receives its light from the sun”. The pope has the right to interfere with the political 
decisions that have consequences on the spiritual and moral life. The pope thus cannot interfere 
with the election of the emperor, but he can and must examine his moral qualities and he can 
excommunicate him, if he is unworthy or if he menaces the ecclesiastical order. In Innocent’s III 
view, the pope is no more the vicar of St. Peter, but the vicar of Christ himself and thus his power 
comes directly from God.  
The doctrine was completed by Innocent IV’s canonists (Henry of Susa), stating the permanent 
authority of the pope on the temporal governments, while Innocent III had limited it to urgent and 
special cases: the pope is  the ordinary judge of everybody (judex ordinarius omnium), he is at the 
top of the whole civil construction and his power is higher and beyond any other spiritual and 
temporal power.   
Boniface VIII (1294-1303) increased the level of the dogmatic statements16. The bull Ineffabilis 
amor (1296) restated the superiority of the Church and the bull Unam sanctam (1302) completed 
the theocratic construction. God is the only source of authority, the Church is God’s city on earth 
and his chief, the vicar of Christ, is the master and judge of the temporal princes. The independence 
of the temporal power is heretical as it would imply the dualism of the sources of authority. 
Therefore, the supremacy of the Church is not just ratione peccati, as it has plenitudo potestatis on 
the whole temporal and spiritual governance. 
The theocratic doctrine began to decline since the middle of the XIV century, when confronted with 
the theological attacks from university scholars (Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham) and with 
the increasingly powerful nation-States, that entailed the decline of the feudal structures but also of 
their menace to the autonomy of the Church. However, the theocratic ideas survived inside the 
Church for a long time after the doctrine had been dismantled: 
 
                                                 
15 [According to our fullness of power, we can lawfully decide above the law itself] 
16 The occasion was the conflicts with Philippe the Fair, when he tried to raise a tithe on the French clergy without 
previous permission from the pope and then when he prosecuted the bishop of Pamiers charged with treachery. 
 9
« Si les transformations historiques conduisent rapidement à la détérioration de l’édifice théocratique, 
l’Eglise ne renonce pas aussi vite à certains principes qui en furent le fondement. Car il est clair que jusqu’à 
la fin du XIX siècle, elle persiste à considérer que l’Etat n’a pas de fin en soi et qu’il doit seulement aider les 
hommes à atteindre la cité céleste par la pratique religieuse et le respect de la morale »17 (Pacaut, 1957, 220). 
 
3. The evolution of the succession rules 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the development of the theocratic doctrine was accompanied by the 
evolution of the succession rules, which, once established, showed much greater resistance. 
Elections had been for centuries the usual way to appoint the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The autocratic 
turn of the XI-XIII centuries reserved them for the papal succession, while direct appointment by 
the pope became the common practice for the bishops. At the same time, the electoral rules evolved 
from unanimity to majority principle.  
  
3.1 Unanimity as the optimal rule in the ancient Church  
In the Latin Church of the origins the episcopal succession required the election from the clergy and 
the laity18: “post divinum iudicium, post populi suffragium, post coepiscoporum consensum”19 
wrote Cyprians (Epistulae, 59, 5). The Roman synod of 499, the Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua (end of 
V century), the Apostolic constitutions (end of IV century) all explicitly recognize the laity’s role, 
which was essentially a proof (testimonium, suffragium) of the quality of the candidate: 
 
« ..doit être ordonné comme évêque ..une personne en tout irréprochable, élu par tout le peuple. Celui-ci 
ayant été désigné et bénéficiant de l’assentiment général, le peuple s’étant réuni avec les prêtres et les 
évêques présents, celui qui est à la tête du groupe interroge les clercs et le peuple pour savoir si c’est bien 
celui-là qu’ils demandent comme un chef. Ceux-ci ayant fait un signe d’assentiment, il leur demande ensuite 
si tous témoignent que il est digne d’un gouvernement si grande et illustre »20 (Apostolic Constitution, 
quoted in Gaudement, 1979, 20).   
 
                                                 
17 [Although the historical events rapidly destroyed the theocratic construction, the Church did not give up some of its 
fundamental principles altogether. Until the end of the XIX century, the Church still considered that the State is not an 
end in itself and that it must help its citizens to attain the heavenly city by the religious practice and the respect of the 
public morals] 
18 The Eastern Churches and their councils in the first half of the IV century (Nicea, Antioch, Sardica, Laodicea) 
prescribed the episcopal appointment by cooptation.  
19 [After the divine judgement, after the voting of the laity, after the consensus of the bishops] 
20 […the appointed bishop must be an irreproachable person, chosen by all the people. When he has been appointed and 
the people has been gathered together with the priests and the other bishops, the leader of the group asks the laity and 
the clergy to test whether they really want the candidate as their chief. If they make a sign of assent, he asks them if 
they all witness that he is up to such a great and important task].  
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The Christians of Rome chose their bishop, the pope, in the same way. The first three popes (Lino, 
Cleto, Clement) were naturally appointed as they had been co-operators of St. Peter. Alexander I 
(106-115) was the first pope to be elected after the consultation of the whole community. The laity 
was progressively restricted to the civic notables, the imperial executives, the municipal 
magistrates, the garrison officials and the noble families, who took the leadership of the vox populi 
(Zizola, 1993; Alberigo, 1989, Levillain, 1994).  
Unanimity dominated these elections, as documented by the ancient texts of the first centuries 
referring to electio concorditer or unanimiter facta, unanimes conclamaverunt, pari voto et unanimi 
consensu21. Pope Leo the Great wrote in 445: “Qui praefuturus est omnibus, ab omnibus 
eligatur”22. One reason for the request of unanimity was certainly that the ancient Church was a 
rather primitive political and juridical body with unsettled decision-making procedures. The laity’s 
consensus was expressed in a disordered and sometimes violent way, as there was no regular 
scrutiny. 
A second fundamental reason was that the Church considered itself not an ethnic, but a mystic 
body, the body of Christ himself: therefore, its members had to the duty to agree on a unanimous 
decision (consensio una et simplex et iuncta concordia said Cyprian, Epistulae, 11,3) inspired by 
God, as in the first community of the Apostles (2 Co. 8, 19 and 23; 1 Co. 16,3; Ac. 4,32 and 6,3). 
Basically, only God can elect: “solus eligit Deus, solus ipse confirmat, cum superiorem non 
habet”23 (Dante, De Monarchia, III,16: 13).  
Unanimity in the ancient Church did not imply granting the individual a veto power and thus the 
opportunity for strategic behaviour in order to extract side payments from the other voters (Klick 
and Parisi, 2003). Rather it was the expression of the assembly as a whole, from which the 
individual was neither separated nor protected24. Such a concept of unanimity implied that deciding 
was a collective and spontaneous act of coordination on a focal point, God’s will. Historical and 
narrative sources extensively account for the emergence of the focal point (Gaudement, 1998). 
Symbolic events often helped the assembly to focus its attention on the best candidate and thus 
revealed God’s will: a dream, the sun ray, the apparition of a dove, a child’s voice. God sometimes 
indicated a totally unknown candidate or put a halt to the pious hesitancy of a saint or showed the 
place where he was hidden. God’s intervention stopped the conflicts between the clergy and the 
                                                 
21 [An election made consensually, at unanimity; they unanimously acclaimed; with both unanimous voting and 
consensus] 
22 [The one who will be the head of everybody, be elected by everybody] 
23 [Only God chooses, only He confirms, as there is no higher authority] 
24 Grossi (1958) states that the concept of unanimity in the Church was opposed to the concept of unanimity in the 
ancient German societies, where it meant the consent of all single individuals. Unanimity in the ecclesiastical sphere 
was the essence of the mystical body, a duty for the believers. The dissenting minority was generally considered 
heretical.  
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laity and turned into legal elections what would otherwise be illegal appointments, such as those 
made by the predecessor or by the king.  
Rules for governing a mystic body, where individual interests merge in the search for the collective 
or divine will, proved frail when secular influences added: however, the fascination of unanimity 
did not decreased in time and it continued to be considered the only desirable rule also when it had 
to be necessarily substituted. In the papal elections, beside the procedures per scrutinium [by 
voting] and per compromissum [by compromise], the election per inspirationem [by inspiration]  
reminded of the ancient electio concorditer facta and of the unanimous will of the assembly: “Aliter 
electio facta non valeat, nisi forte communiter esset ab omnibus quasi per inspirationem sine vitio 
celebrata”25 (VI Lateran Council, 1215). 
 
3.2 Consolidating the autocracy: the direct appointment of the bishops 
As a first step to reduce the external influences on the successions, the Church limited the size of 
the electorate: this mitigated the pneumatic aspects of the elections, which became an increasingly 
political act. The electorate was restricted to the clergy and the laity was excluded: Ducendus est 
populus, non sequendus26, was the principle that grounded the belief that the laity has not the right 
to choose, but only to consent to the choice. At the end of the XII century, even this final consent 
was no more required (Summa Reginensis, 1191) . 
Nevertheless, the regime for the episcopal succession remained highly permeable by secular 
interferences during the XII and XIII century. The counter-moves of the Church was the further 
restriction of the episcopal electorate only to the priests of the cathedral (pope Alexander III in 1180 
and IV Lateran Council); the direct appointment by the metropolitan bishop or by the pope when 
the local electoral college was inactive or unable to elect the new bishop within three months (the so 
called ‘devolution’; IV Lateran Council, 1215); finally, the direct appointment of loyal bishops by 
the pope, as pope Innocent IV did in his conflict with Frederic II. 
Supported by the theocratic doctrine of the plenitudo potestatis, the direct appointment by the pope 
became the usual practice at the end of the XIII century. From 1295 and 1301 in France, only one 
bishop out of 16 was chosen after an election and during the papacy of John XXII (1316-1324) 
there were 9 elections in the 127 French dioceses but 230 direct appointments by the pope. 
 
                                                 
25 [Other electoral procedures are invalid, but for the case when the election is regularly held and all voters jointly 
decide as under inspiration]. 
26 [The people must be guided and not followed]. The principle was stated by pope Celestin in his Letters to the bishops 
of Puglia and Calabria (in 429) and was confirmed by the Decree of ‘Gratian’ in 1140. 
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3.3 Sub-optimal decision-making rules: from the double principle of maioritas et sanioritas to 
the pure numerical rule  
Not only the electorate, but also the electoral procedures were modified to speed up the elections 
and to avoid inefficient results. When the laity and clergy could not coordinate on a focal point, as 
either there was no suitable candidate or there was more than one, the solution was the appeal to the 
hierarchical superior authority, the metropolitan bishop, who appointed the more zealous and 
virtuous candidate27 and confirmed the election. Along with the restriction of the electorate, the 
appeal to the superior authority was gradually substituted by a majority rule, which granted a 
quicker procedure and avoided external interferences. The elections were thus changing from the 
transcendent revelation of the divine will into a pure juridical act. The Roman majority principle 
imposed itself as the optimal ‘non-unanimity’ rule (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 2003) to 
isolate the decision-making process of this restricted electorate.  
However, the pure rule of the number was not apt to the needs of the Church, which required a final 
control over the electoral outcome. The solution was to associate a qualitative criterium: votes had 
not just to be counted, they had also to be weighted according to the merits either of the electors 
(sanioritas28) or of the candidate and a double criterium of majority and sanioritas was applied in 
the canonical elections29. A true majority was made by the simultaneous presence of a pars 
numerosior and of a pars sanior: Non sufficit maioritas numeri sine sanioritate…… Non ergo 
sufficit sanioritas nisi etiam concurrat maioritas30, Panormitanus wrote (Commentaria, ch. 57 and 
42). The principle of sanioritas had also the positive feature of avoiding cyclical results in the 
application of the majority voting.  
The application of the principle, however, still required the arbitrium boni iudicis, i.e. that an 
impartial and superior authority could weight the votes and decide which part was sanior. In St. 
Benedict’s rule, the arbitrator was the bishop, who confirmed the election of the abbot and 
evaluated the coexistence of both a numerosior et sanior pars. The metropolitan bishop did the 
same for the episcopal elections. The judgement on the sanioritas could overturn not only a 
                                                 
27 One of the more ancient document is a letter by pope Leo I to the bishop of Thessalonica in 446: “Si forte,…. vota 
eligentium in duas se diviserint partes, is metropolitani iudicio alteri preferatur, qui maioribus iuvatur studiis et 
meritis” [In case the voters divide in two groups, the metropolitan bishop will choose the candidate with greater zeal 
and merits] (quoted in Gaudemet, 1998). 
28 Sanioritas consisted of auctoritas, zelus, sapientiae  doctrina and meritum. Authority derived from the position of the 
voter, his ecclesiastic rank, his age. Zelus meant the uncorrupted disposition of the voters. Meritum et doctrina referred 
to the qualities of the candidates. These positive requirements for both voters and candidates are in sharp contrast with 
the current practice of admitting only negative moral requirements in elections.  
29 The principle of sanioritas was introduced in times when unanimity still dominated, as the guiding rule for the 
exceptions to unanimity. In St. Benedict’s rule (ch.64) the choice of the abbot required the unanimous consent of the 
congregation. If unanimity failed, the right to elect had to be entrusted to the wiser part of the congregation, 
independently of its size (pars congregationis, quamvis parva, sanioris consilio). This sanior pars would elect the most 
eminent member. Thus sanioritas of the voters was a guarantee of the sanioritas of the elected one and vice versa. 
30 [Numerical majority is insuficient without merits... However, merits are insufficient without numerical majority] 
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majority result, but also a unanimous voting, if this had been inspired by bad feelings, malice, 
animosity, partisan interests. Minor pars maior respectu sanioris consilii praevalet31 stated the 
Hostiensis, who continued saying that even one single individual could make his own judgement 
prevail over the preferences of all other voters: unus ergo potest contradicere totae universitati, si 
habet rationabilem causam32 (Glossa ch.11 D.31). 
It was obviously difficult to have positive results in elections, unless maioritas et sanioritas 
coexisted in the same group of voters. This difficulty gave birth to a new doctrine, introducing the 
presumption that, unless the contrary was proved, the part with numerical majority coincided with 
the part with the wiser opinion: Maior pars numero praesumitur sanior, praesumitur enim in dubio 
pro numero. Haec tamen praesumptio admittit probationem in contrarium33 (Glossa ch.1 X, 3, 11). 
The minority, which claimed to be greater in wisdom, could demonstrate its sanioritas in front of 
the hierarchical superior. However, the element of arbitrariness implied by the recourse to the 
impartial arbitrator was still troublesome, as it could subject the election to external influences. In 
the collection Elegentia in iure divino (or Summa Coloniensis) written in 1169, the risks due to the 
judge’s arbitrariness are so described: 
 
« We may ask whether the metropolitan bishop can refuse the unanimous election of a unworthy candidate. 
If the electors persist in their votes, the judge must approve the election or prove something against the 
candidate [….]The superior authority [ ….] cannot repeal the election, unless he has very good reasons to do 
it or unless the voters change their opinion. The possibility to repeal an election could give a corrupted judge 
a splendid occasion to act by malice and thus the right would be changed into injustice » (ch.49). 
 
To avoid this risk, the presumption of sanioritas of the majority was further strengthened: a great 
numerical majority (numerus multo excedens) implied iuris et de jure that it was also the greater 
part with respect to the wisdom of judgement ( pars maior respectu sanioris consilii).  
A ‘great majority’ was soon identified with a 2/3 majority. In 1274, Gregory X extended to all 
canonical elections the principle that a majority of 2/3 wins independently of the proof of 
sanioritas. The canonists stated that the principle of sanioritas could still apply in two cases:  
1) when a majority of 2/3 could not be reached and the minority was clearly the wiser part of 
the electorate (Goffredi de Trano);  
                                                 
31 [A minority, which is however wiser in its judgement, is to prevail] 
32 [One single voter can oppose the whole assembly, provided he has reasonable justifications] 
33 [Numerical majority is presumed to coincide with the healthier part; in dubious cases the presumption is in favour of 
the number. However, this presumption allows for proof to the contrary] 
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2) when an unworthy candidate was elected by voters knowing of his indignity: in this case 
they would be deprived of their voting rights for three years, their votes would be spoiled 
and the right to decide would be entrusted to the minority (III Lateran Council, 1179). 
The secrecy of the votes was the final step towards the dominance of the numerical principle, as the 
sanior pars was no more recognisable: the ancient presumption that the majority was also the wisest 
part did not allow for proof to the contrary. This practice was sanctioned in the Trent Council 
(1520-1563), were the secrecy of votes was imposed to the papal and to the monastic successions, 
the only ones where elections still took place, as the bishops were definitely directly appointed by 
the pope. 
 
4. The papal elections: the establishment of a selectorate 
 
The papal election was originally entrusted to the clergy and the laity. A common practice in the 
first centuries was, however, that the pope himself indicated his successor to avoid disorders after 
his death: the indication was however often disregarded34. Given the conflicts that since the second 
half of the fifth century marked the papal elections35 and that originated in the contest between 
Rome and Constantinople, in 498 pope Symmachus declared that, in case the incumbent pope could 
not indicate his successor, unanimous voting was required: majority voting could be applied only in 
the last resort.  
To isolate the election from external influences, a synodal decree by pope Gregory III in 769 
reserved the papal election only to the clergy, (electio clericorum), that chose from a list of names 
prepared by the Roman notables (honoratorum arbitrium) and was finally approved by the 
population (testimonia populorum). However, for nearly five centuries the election was prey of the 
influences of the ambitious Roman families, of the pressures exerted by the Byzantine emperors, by 
the Ostrogoth, Lombard and Frankish rulers. The pope could then be consecrated only after the 
political approval. King Lothar imposed the presence of the emperor’s ambassadors during the 
election, granted the active electorate only to the Romans and the passive electorate only to the 
noblemen, required a fidelity oath from the newly elected pope.  
                                                 
34 The history of the V century is emblematic. Pope Felix IV appointed the archdeacon Boniface as his successor in 530. 
The Roman clergy however elected the deacon Dioscorus, who was loyal to Byzantium. At Dioscorus’s death, Boniface 
was elected pope and he appointed the deacon Vigilius as his successor. The indication was disregarded, as the 
Ostrogoth court oriented the election in favour of the priest Mercurius, who became pope John II in 533. Vigilius 
became pope two years later, in 535.  
35 The first electoral dispute dates back to the III century and it was occasioned by the election of pope Cornelius (in 
251), which was challenged by the secretary of the Roman presbyters Novatian. The disputes was settled by the bishop 
Cyprian and by the decision of a Roman Synod. 
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The Papal Reform of the XI century began with the return to the free election of the popes. In 1059, 
Nicolas II radically reformed the electoral system. The emperor was deprived of the right to 
approve the election. To guarantee the voters’ independence, the electorate was restricted to the 
cardinal-bishops, the dignitaries of the Roman clergy who assisted the pope in the liturgical 
celebrations and who formed the consistory. The cardinal-priests had to ‘assist’ the cardinal-bishops 
in the election, while the consensus of the clergy and of the population was no more essential36. The 
consistory was exalted as the heir and successor of the Apostles’ college, with the role of co-
operators of Peter’s successor37.  
A selectorate was thus legally established with the specific purpose of maintaining the papal 
succession within the autocracy. Although direct appointment and hereditary succession were 
forbidden, the pope could exercise an influence on the choice of his successor by appointing new 
cardinals to his liking. He could not however totally renew the consistory, as the cardinals’ 
appointment is a life-long one. The electoral outcome thus remained highly unpredictable and very 
often the most favoured candidates were not elected. 
Against the consolidation of the autocratic regime played, however, the fact that the creation of a 
selectorate, charged with the succession of the autocrat, concentrated on it the external pressures to 
influence the papal election. All European kingdoms tried to acquire their partisans among the 
cardinals38 and simoniac practices of vote buying became common among the cardinals (the 
election of Alexander VI Borja in 1492 was the paroxysmal case), until Julius’ II bull, Cum tam 
divino,  invalidated any simoniac election. 
The strategy of the Church to consolidate the autocratic succession included also rules for the 
selectorate, namely the introduction of qualified majority voting and the institution of the conclave 
(§. 4.1). However, the frequent and long schisms of the XII and XIII centuries proved the 
insufficiency of the autocratic and rule-based approach to defend the autonomy of the Church. The 
constitutional crises were then the occasion for the conciliar movement to enlarge the selectorate 
and to try to introduce accountability mechanisms (§.4.2). 
 
4.1. The decision-making rules of the selectorate 
                                                 
36 Only the public announcement (pronuntiatio ad clerum et populum) of the electoral result remained compulsory until 
pope Innocent III. 
37 The biblical and theological justification of the cardinals college was given in the Decree Per venerabilem by 
Innocent III in 1202. Reference was also made to elderly appointed by Moses as his counsellors: this Leviticus 
priesthood was founded in the Ancient Testament and arrived at perfection with the Roman consistory. 
38 The national States interferences with the papal election continued all along the history of the Church and took also 
the form of a veto power against single candidates. The habit of the so called ‘exclusive’ allowed the Austrian, Spanish 
and French governments to exclude one name from the list of the candidates to the papacy. The practice was employed 
frequently in the XIX century and was definitely interrupted in 1904, when Pius X menaced the excommunication of 
the cardinals who expressed a veto against a candidate during the conclave.  
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The ideal requirement of unanimous voting, which was the proof of the divine intervention, when 
transferred to the restricted body of the cardinals, lost much of its spiritual traits and much more 
resembled the modern concept of unanimity, i.e. the granting of a veto power to the voters. The 
significant impact of transaction costs, side payments and strategic behaviours can be detected from 
the long vacancies of the papal See, due to the difficulty to converge on one single candidate: pope 
Gregory X was elected after a vacancy of two years and nine months. 
A voting rule less strict than unanimity was thus necessary: qualified majority voting (2/3 majority) 
was introduced by the III Lateran Council in 1179. A candidate, obtaining less that 2/3 votes but 
nevertheless claiming the papacy, was to be excommunicated together with those who supported 
him. The IV Lateran Council (1215) constitutionalised the three electoral systems that had been in 
use since the beginning of the XII century: per scrutinium, per compromissum and per 
inspirationem (the remnant of the unanimous choice). The system per scrutinium  was a secret 
voting and ballot papers were first distributed to the cardinals who elected Innocent III in 1198. 
The double principle of maioritas and sanioritas was not applicable to papal elections, because no 
hierarchical superior could be invoked above the pope and because, under the dominant autocratic 
tendency, the general councils were not considered a suitable supreme instance. Thus, 
automatically, the maior pars was identified with the pars saniori consilii. Only the emperor 
Frederic I tried to apply the principle of sanioritas to judge on the double election of Alexander III 
and Victor IV, his preferred candidate, in 1159. Unsuccessfully, the emperor summoned a Council 
in Pavia in 1160 to demonstrate that Victor IV, who had received five votes out of twenty-eight, 
was the expression on the sanior pars.   
The selectorate of the Church was not left acting on its own greed, as its inaction and the 
consequent long vacancies of the apostolic See could endanger the autonomy of the Church. To 
accelerate the negotiations, a set of ‘incentives’ was first spontaneously applied39 by the population 
and by the local civil authorities40, then they were specified by the canonical law and, in particular, 
by pope Gregory’s X constitution Ubi periculum (1274)41. The cardinals were obliged to close 
themselves in the papal palace within ten days after the pope’s death. Nobody could approach them 
                                                 
39 The first papal conclave was probably the Perugia conclave of 1216 that elected Onorio III and that ended in a 
compromise arctantibus perusinis, i.e. because of the pressures exercised by the people of Perugia. Zizola (1993) 
anticipates the first conclave to the Roman one that elected Innocent III in 1198. The first time that the pope’s election 
took place in a segregated  place was on the occasion of the election of Gelasio II in 1118. 
40 The first conclaves were endured by the cardinals as an imprisonment. During the conclave that elected pope Celestin 
IV, a seventy days seclusion during the Roman summer caused collapses among the cardinals and the death of the 
candidate of the majority: the new pope himself survived only seventeen days after his election. Pope Gregory X was 
elected in Viterbo after a two years vacancy in 1271: the cardinals found a compromise only when the civil authorities 
and the people of Viterbo closed them in the papal palace, cut their food supplies and removed the roof of the palace, 
exposing the cardinals to bad weather.   
41 Gregory’s X constitution was strongly opposed by the cardinals and abolished for nearly eighteen years, until pope 
Celestin V restated it and pope Boniface VIII definitely inserted it in the Book VI of the Decretali. 
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nor communicate with them and they were deprived of all their income during the conclave days. If, 
after three days the new pope had still not been chosen, the cardinals’ meals would have been 
limited to one dish for seven days. If, during this time, the new pope was not elected, the meals 
would have been limited to bread, water and wine.  
As in the other canonical elections, the modern concept of electoral representation cannot be 
applied. As a matter of fact, the electing body, the cardinals, cannot govern the Church during the 
See vacancy, the period elapsing from one pope’s death to his successor’s election. In this time the 
Church is headless: the cardinals are just the substitutes of the pope (vice capitis), as their power is 
a human one, while only the pope is God’s vicar. This concept met the resistance of the selectorate, 
which repeatedly tried to assert its own full power during the See vacancy. It was however finally 
established in 1311 by pope Clemens V.  
Besides, the cardinals always failed in their repeated attempts to impose the elected pope the respect 
of the so called Capitolazioni, a pre-electoral formal commitment behind the veil of ignorance: all 
cardinals committed that the one of them who would have been elected, would then respected an 
agreed upon political platform. The commitment was however not credible, as the absolute power 
of the pope could easily disregard it. The Capitolazione agreed in the conclave of 1352 was rejected 
by pope Innocent IV, who had signed it as a cardinal. The pope alleged that it was contrary to the 
Decretali of Gregory IX, that granted the cardinals only the electoral right. Other Capitolazioni 
were not explicitly rejected but simply unapplied (as for the one that committed Eugene IV, 1431-
1447), until in 1505 Julius II declared that elections under conditions were invalid. 
 
4.2  An irrevocable appointment? 
The autocratic reform did not admit any accountability mechanisms. Gregory’s VII Dictatus papae 
(1075) stated that, as the pope is God’s vicar on earth, nobody could judge or dismiss him, neither 
the consistory nor the ecumenical council: “no judgement of the pope may be revised by anyone 
and he alone may revise the judgement of all” (Dictatus papae, proposition 18). The religious 
nature of the papal power and of the electoral moment made irrevocable the choice of the 
selectorate. An open overthrown of God’s vicar by the selectorate was constitutionally 
unacceptable42. The one occasion in which the selectorate reneged on its own choice opened, in 
fact, a deep constitutional crises.  
In 1378, five months after the appointment of Urban VI (1379-1389), the cardinals alleged the 
invalidity of his election, claiming that they had been induced by the mob to quickly appoint an 
                                                 
42 However, attempts to overthrown a pope have not been infrequent in the history of the Church, as demonstrated by 
the violent coups performed by the rival Roman families during the VIII-IX centuries or by the poisoning of some 
popes in VIII-IX century  
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Italian pope and proceeded to elect Clement VII (1378–94). The constitutional rules for the papal 
succession proved then their limits: as both the pope and his anti-pope were backed by a part of the 
consistory and refused to abdicate and as no superior authority could be indicated by the canonical 
law to judge on the dispute, a schism opened, which lasted for thirty-nine years (the Great Schism, 
1378-1417). It ended when the cardinals decided to appeal and summon an ecumenical council in 
Pisa (1408-1409). 
Backed by the doctrines of the university scholars, according to which a general council could judge 
and in case dismiss an heretic or an incompetent pope, the Pisa Council affirmed that a prolonged 
schism could be likened to an heresy, it dismissed both popes and elected a new one. As the two 
incumbent popes did not obeyed the council and the schism continued, the same decision was 
repeated in the subsequent Council of Constance (1413-1418), which definitely dismissed the three 
previously elected popes (John XXIII, Benedict XIII and Gregory XII) and canonically elected a 
new one, Martin V (1417-1431). Some years later, the Council of Basel, Ferrara-Florence (1431-
1442) deposed the canonically elected pope Eugene IV who did not recognise its supreme authority. 
The conciliar movement however found little support in the Church and among the secular rulers 
and was dispersed in 144943: “apparently the conciliarists at Basel had overplayed their hand in the 
game of the Church power politics” (Gordon, 1999,120) 
The councils raised the issues of representation and accountability, that the autocratic reform had 
excluded. The conciliar theses were not uniform, however the accountability issue was central in 
most of them. Marsilius of Padua (Defensor pacis, 1324) stated that the legitimisation of the power 
comes from the people both in the civil society and in the Church, where is it delegated to the 
general council. William of Ockham (Dialogus, 1343) said that the Church was the congregation of 
the believers which, not being able to directly exercise its power, delegates it to the council. Konrad 
of Gelnhausen stated that only the universal Church and its representative, the council, cannot err. 
The power of the militant Church comes from Christ, stated the Haec sancta decree (1415) of the 
Council of Constance, adding that each Christian, and the pope too, must obey the council in 
matters that touch faith and the reform of the Church. In the mid XV century, the canonist Nicola 
de’ Tedeschi wrote: 
 
“The foundation of jurisdiction lies in the universal Church; however, as the universal Church, that consists 
of the universe of the believers, cannot be summoned together, … the Church exercises this jurisdiction by 
means of the council, that represents it”. 
                                                 
43 The councils soon became a political weapon in the hands of the national states, which in the XIV-XV century 
contributed to their summoning, organization and results (Camelot et al., 2001). Pope Pius VII formally condemned the 
doctrine of conciliar supremacy in 1460. 
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 Even without seeing in the conciliar movement the first seeds of modern parliamentarism and of a 
mixed form of government (Gordon, 1999), it however represented an attempt to profit from a 
constitutional crises to generate accountability mechanisms inside the autocracy and to enlarge the 
selectorate. The autocratic tendency of the Church finally prevailed: the selectorate was restricted to 
the consistory, the popes restated their supreme authority and new generations of canonists 
supported the idea of a monarchic papacy. The councils were then interrupted for three centuries. 
 
5. Some remarks 
 
Some observations about the peculiar traits of the autocratic regime of the Latin Church can be 
drawn from the above historical account. The first remark concerns the exceptional stability of the 
autocracy and of its rules for succession, which bears no comparison with other secular autocracies.  
 
5.1. Why so much stability? 
The amazing stability of the canonical succession rules, established in the XI-XIII century and 
substantially kept unchanged until today, can be certainly explained by the taste for tradition of the 
Church. Besides, the Church does not need to fear that excess stability generates opportunistic 
strategies of the elected representatives, as it happens in modern democracies, where  
 
“[..] permanency can encourage investment in devices apt to bypass the rules, leading to a zero- or negative-
sum outcome. It is with time that the agents learn how to adjust to the constraints they face, so that a change 
of rules can at times be better than the best of rules to keep the proper set of incentives” (Galeotti, 2003, 
194)”. 
 
In the Church, a change of the rules would not provide for better incentives, as the incumbent 
leadership does not feel the spur of competition: their life-long and irrevocable charge protects them 
against the risk of not being re-elected, while they are accountable not to their constituency but only 
to their hierarchical superior, be it the bishop, the metropolitan or God.  
Other explanations can be found in history, in the decreasing challenges to the Church autonomy 
from the secular powers and, we believe, in the quite satisfactory results obtained in isolating the 
leadership replacement: as a matter of fact, the appointment of anti-popes (forty in all) ceased with 
Felix V in 1449. Besides, qualified majority voting, with the implicit acknowledgement that the 
maior pars is also the sanior pars, is a good second best solution with respect to the first best 
unanimity rule. It provides for a large consensus that mimics the original consensio una et simplex 
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et iuncta concordia, which was the proof of the divine will in the transmission of the religious 
power.   
 
5.2 Sticking to elections: the concern for quality  
Tullock (1987) points out the advantages of hereditary succession for the autocracies and the 
defects of the other replacement mechanisms, in particular the direct appointment. Hereditary 
succession, reducing competition and risks for the successor, reduces also the probability of a 
violent overthrown of the autocrat: “hereditary succession does not guarantee a peaceful 
succession,. it [however] seems to be more peaceful than other methods” (Tullock, 1987, 162). 
Direct appointment, on the contrary, puts the autocrat on a very risky position, as the appointed 
successor’s expected benefits from a coup can be very high and the costs negligible.  
With the exception of the first centuries, the direct appointment of the successor was severely 
forbidden in the autocratic papacy of the Middle Ages: when in 1197 Celestin III unsuccessfully 
tried to break the rule, the cardinals objected that the pope is not the owner (dominus) of the 
Church, but only its administrator (dispensator). The same limit was restated by St. Bernard, 
besides a strong supporter of the plenitudo potestatis doctrine. However, the reason for excluding 
the direct appointment should not be seen in the personal risks for the incumbent pope, much more 
in the concerns for a legitimate transmission of power and for the quality of the appointment.  
Legitimate transmission of ecclesiastic power requires a connection with the original divine 
mandate and the election, with the flavour of mystical convergence of the electors’ will on one 
single candidate, sacralises the succession.  
The concern for the quality of the appointee is also relevant, as a bad choice can be dangerous for 
the institution. A collective choice is better than the incumbent’s decision in granting that a suitable 
candidate is appointed: “Per plures melius veritas inquiritur”44 (Apparatus, ch. 42, X), wrote pope 
Innocent IV. Likewise, the Council of Antioch (341), which explicitly forbade the incumbent 
bishops to appoint their successors, feared not so much that the successor could murder the 
incumbent, rather that the successor could not be worthy: 
 
« The bishops are not allowed to appoint their own successor, when they are approaching the end of their 
life. If something like this has been done, the appointment will be invalid. On the contrary the ecclesiastic 
rule must be respected, according to which the appointment is made after summoning a synod and hearing 
the opinions of the bishops who, after the death of the incumbent, have the authority to choose a suitable 
successor » (Council of Antioch, ch.23; quoted in Gaudemet, 1998, 18). 
 
                                                 
44 [Truth is more effectively pursued by many] 
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The same concern for quality can be detected from the requirement of the laity’s consent to the 
elections, which was a proof of the qualities of the appointee, from the introduction of the principle 
of sanioritas and from the unusually long list of qualities a candidate must have to be eligible 
according to the canonical law. As the core concern of the autocracy is its own survival and 
autonomy, this implies not only the peaceful transmission of power, but also the appointment of 
candidates who are up to the tasks, have a sense of mission and are faithful to the institution. 
Although the results in the Church history have sometimes been disappointing, this concern for the 
institution survival seems to differentiate religious autocracies from secular autocratic regimes. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The autocratic turn of the Latin Church in the XI-XIII century was born out the need to protect its 
unity and autonomy and to preserve the legitimacy of its power. The Latin Church answered to the 
challenges of the secular power by means of direct political countermoves (excommunication of 
kings and emperors, search for political allies, summoning of crusades), by concentrating the 
decision-making power in the hands of the top hierarchy and finally in the hands of the pope and by 
waving a protection net around the core of its legitimacy. This latter included a doctrinal support, 
theocracy, stating the supremacy of the spiritual power over the temporal powers, and the 
constitutionalisation of the procedures for leadership replacement.  
In particular, the active electorate was limited to the clergy and the episcopal election was gradually 
substituted by the pope’s direct appointment. Besides, the voting rules changed from unanimity, 
conceived as the expression of the divine will, to the dual principle of maioritas et sanioritas and 
finally to the numerical rule of qualified majority. This evolution aimed at preserving the election 
from external interferences and at eliminating the elements of arbitrariness (the evaluation of an 
external judge).  
The most important succession, the papal election, was protected by institutionalising a selectorate 
and its decision-making rules: qualified majority voting (no sanioritas principle could be applied), 
no electoral mandates and the conclave. The concerns for autonomy and for the quality of the 
electoral results conditioned the evolution of the canonical rules for the papal succession, avoiding 
the direct appointment and sticking to an electoral process dominated by the pure rule of the 
numbers.  
At least partly, the Church meets Besely and Kudamatsu’s (2007) criteria for a successful 
autocracy. In particular, the leadership turnover is controlled by a selectorate which appoints the 
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autocrat’s successor without losing its power45. However, the Latin Church autocracy is also 
anomalous with respect to secular autocracies: the contest for power, in the form of an open 
succession, is an electoral contest, where the selectorate decides by qualified majority voting. 
Combining a selectorate and elections does not insert accountability and representation mechanisms 
in the autocracy, rather it protects the autonomy of the regime and the quality of the appointed 
leadership. 
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Figure 1 – The Latin Church in the XI-XIII centuries 
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